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Abstract
The United States has experienced prolonged severe shortages of vital medications over
the past two decades. The causes underlying the severity and prolongation of these short-
ages are complex, in part due to the complexity of the underlying supply chain networks,
which involve supplier-buyer interactions across multiple entities with competitive and coop-
erative goals. This leads to interesting challenges in maintaining consistent interactions and
trust among the entities. Furthermore, disruptions in supply chains influence trust by induc-
ing over-reactive behaviors across the network, thereby impacting the ability to consistently
meet the resulting fluctuating demand. To explore these issues, we model a pharmaceutical
supply chain with boundedly rational artificial decision makers capable of reasoning about
the motivations and behaviors of others. We use multiagent simulations where each agent
represents a key decision maker in a pharmaceutical supply chain. The agents possess a
Theory-of-Mind capability to reason about the beliefs, and past and future behaviors of other
agents, which allows them to assess other agents’ trustworthiness. Further, each agent has
beliefs about others’ perceptions of its own trustworthiness that, in turn, impact its behavior.
Our experiments reveal several counter-intuitive results showing how small, local disrup-
tions can have cascading global consequences that persist over time. For example, a buyer,
to protect itself from disruptions, may dynamically shift to ordering from suppliers with a
higher perceived trustworthiness, while the supplier may prefer buyers with more stable
ordering behavior. This asymmetry can put the trust-sensitive buyer at a disadvantage dur-
ing shortages. Further, we demonstrate how the timing and scale of disruptions interact with
a buyer’s sensitivity to trustworthiness. This interaction can engender different behaviors
and impact the overall supply chain performance, either prolonging and exacerbating even
small local disruptions, or mitigating a disruption’s effects. Additionally, we discuss the impli-
cations of these results for supply chain operations.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been an epidemic of drug shortages affecting the United
States. According to [1], between 2008 and 2014 the number of lifesaving drugs in shortage
increased by 393% and the number of drugs in shortage with no acceptable substitute increased
by 125%. According to the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP), the rate of
new shortages is increasing in recent years and the number of active shortages in the second
quarter of 2019 reached a height of 282 products [2]. In a 2018 survey of 719 pharmacy practice
managers and pharmacy leaders, 69.2% of them state that in the previous year they experienced
more than 50 shortages [3].
Drug shortages can have significant dire consequences such as cancelled surgeries [4] and
postponed chemotherapy infusions [5]. In cases where a drug can be substituted with another
product, drug shortages result in greater costs incurred by an already burdened healthcare
delivery system [6]. Thus, these shortages directly translate into a risk to public health and
safety.
Further, the United States is not the only country struggling with drug shortages, as it has
become a more global issue. For example, Pauwels et al. [7] sent a survey to Hospital Pharmacy
Europe subscribers and 45% stated that they had experienced a shortage of life-saving drugs
and 30% of respondents associated these shortages with an increase in healthcare costs. A 2019
article [8] reports that drug shortages in Europe are still persisting.
A variety of interacting stakeholders are involved in production and distribution of phar-
maceutical drugs, including manufacturers, distributors, and healthcenters. An example of the
interactions between several decision makers in a pharmaceutical supply chain is depicted in
Fig 1. Based on the information provided by manufacturers to the University of Utah Drug
Information Service, the reasons for 51% of reported drug shortages are unknown [2]. Anec-
dotal evidence [9] suggests that stakeholders’ decision making behaviors have an important
role in aggravating drug shortages. In a survey from the Pew Research Center and the Interna-
tional Society for Pharmaceutical Engineering [10], manufacturers claimed that the lack of
guaranteed volume contracts (i.e., steady ordering behavior from buyers), is a key barrier for
entering a market to resolve existing shortages or putting mechanisms in place to prevent
future shortages. On the other hand, the IQVIA Institute for Human Data Science reported
that the variability in the amounts of products received by healthcenters, is a “sentinel of prob-
lems” with instability in the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain [11]. To mitigate both supply
Fig 1. Interaction between decision makers in a pharmaceutical supply chain.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g001
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and demand uncertainty driving this destabilization, a better understanding of the main driv-
ers of the observed variability and how these drivers contribute to prolonged shortages is
needed.
Specifically, there is a need to examine how behaviors of supply chain decision makers
and their responsiveness to observations, whether of supply disruptions or others’ actions,
drive the system’s instability. For example, decision makers in a supply chain may change their
order amounts based on the perceived trustworthiness of their suppliers, or how reliable their
suppliers are in providing the promised amount of product at the promised time. On the other
hand, if there is a shortage, suppliers must decide how to allocate the limited inventory based
on their beliefs about others’ future behaviors as informed by their prior (observed) behavior.
This in turn changes the beliefs and decision making of the other supply chain members. We
hypothesize that this joint adaptation can destabilize the whole system by propagating and
exacerbating the effects of the disruption across the supply chain.
Further, the effects of the disruption may vary based on buyers’ sensitivities to changes in
on-time delivery rates, or the perceived trustworthiness of their suppliers. Aside from these
endogenous behavioral drivers, decision makers also adjust their behaviors in response to
exogenous factors such as the scale and timing of disruptions. Thus, we hypothesize that varia-
tions in the disruptions’ features or in the decision makers’ sensitivities to changes in on-time
delivery rates can lead to different system outcomes as the effects of the disruptions cascade
across the supply chain.
In this paper we focus on three driving factors behind disruptions in pharmaceutical supply
chains: (i) joint adaptation of trustworthiness beliefs, (ii) how sensitive beliefs about trustwor-
thiness are to recent actions taken by other agents, and (iii) disruption characteristics. We use
multiagent simulations to model supply chains like the one in Fig 1. Each key decision maker
is modeled as an autonomous agent that acts based on partial observations of the state of the
supply chain, and reasons about other agents’ beliefs and behaviors via a Theory-of-Mind
(ToM) capability [12]. In particular, each agent has beliefs about the other agents’ perceptions
of its trustworthiness which, in turn, impact its own behavior.
In our study we observe that a buyer, in order to protect itself from disruptions, may order
more from its more trustworthy supplier. However, suppliers, being sophisticated agents
themselves, can reason about other agents in the supply chain. In particular, a supplier may
determine that it cannot profitably adjust to the ordering behavior of the buyer, which results
in it preferring to prioritize fulfilling the requests of another buyer that exhibits a more regular
ordering behavior. As a result, this asymmetric response puts the trust-sensitive buyer at a dis-
advantage in the aftermath of a disruption or when there is a shortage. More importantly, it
may create a long-lasting cascading instability in the system. Furthermore, we find that the
level of trust sensitivity of an agent can either aggravate or mitigate the effects of a disruption,
depending on the underlying features of the disruption. The important implications of these
results for supply chain design and operations are discussed in the paper.
State of the art
While mitigation of supply chain disruptions has been studied extensively, see [13] for a
review, the behavior of decision makers in a disrupted supply chain has received less attention.
Rong et al. [14] considered the classic Beer Game framework in which humans played the roles
of different decision makers. They studied the variability of order amounts in a disrupted sup-
ply chain and showed that when a disruption occurs, order variability increases as one moves
down the supply chain echelons. Sarkar and Kumar [15] also used the Beer Game setting to
show that sharing information about disruptions reduces order variability and supply chain
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costs. Whereas these papers experiment with human decision makers in a supply chain with
only one agent in each echelon, we employ a simulation model with artificial decision makers
which are capable of mimicking human decision makers’ reasoning about the system evolution
and others’ behaviors. Additionally, we analyze human decision making within a network with
multiple agents in each echelon. This allows us to study a range of behaviors in different roles
and with varying numbers of available decisions and reasoning capabilities. This more com-
plex setting is essential to explain real-world supply chains as it allows for modeling decisions
regarding splitting orders among suppliers or allocating limited supplies to fulfill different cus-
tomers’ orders. Such decisions highly influence the system performance when there is an
ongoing shortage.
There exists an extensive body of literature studying how suppliers allocate their inventory
to multiple buyers (e.g. [16–18]) and how buyers split their orders among multiple suppliers
(e.g. [19]). Our main focus in this paper is not comparing different ordering or allocation
schemes, but, instead, we aim to understand the interplay of these decisions by suppliers and
buyers while they act in a network with other decision makers.
Supply chains consist of multiple decision makers which interact in a multi-tiered network
structure. Supply chain decision makers possess all the main characteristics that are attributed
to agents in multiagent frameworks [20]. Namely, they make their decisions with no or little
direct intervention from other decision makers (autonomy). They interact with other decision
makers when they are placing orders, allocating products, etc. (social ability). They perceive
changes in the supply chain environment and respond in a timely fashion, e.g. they observe an
increase in demand and ramp up their production level or order amount (reactivity). Finally,
they have goal-directed behaviors that are not just responses to changes in environment, e.g.
they launch a new product or introduce new machines to their production line (pro-active-
ness). Multiagent frameworks have been shown to be appropriate for the study different inter-
actions between supply chain decision makers [21–23] and therefore we adopt a multiagent
framework in this paper.
Kimbrough et al. [24] used a multiagent system framework for a Beer Game setting, where
they examined whether artificial agents could outperform the decision making of humans. They
compared results from their model with the best available analytical solutions and showed that
the model identified optimal or near optimal solutions. Ghadimi et al. [25] used a multiagent
system to study a sustainable supplier selection and order allocation problem. They observed
that considering sustainability factors can lead to a longer term relationship between the sup-
plier and buyer. Fu and Fu [26] considered a framework which incorporates both a multiagent
system and context-aware computing to optimize cost management in supplier-buyer interac-
tions. They showed that the framework can enhance coordination between the supplier and
buyer and strengthen their adaptability. While we also examine a supplier-buyer dyad, our
agents can reason not only about future states of the system but also about future behaviors of
other agents via ToM reasoning, thereby allowing them to adapt their behavior.
Further, we aim to study joint adaptation of decision makers behaviors when the supply
chain is facing a disruption. In that regard, Giannakis and Louis [27] developed a multiagent
framework to manage and mitigate supply chain disruptions. While they focused on designing
a generic framework that facilitates communication between supply chain agents, in this paper
we take a closer look at behavioral dynamics of a supplier-buyer dyad in a disrupted supply
chain. We also incorporate disruption profiles as a complicating factor. We argue that these
profiles interact with endogenous behavioral dynamics and should be taken into account
when designing mechanisms for mitigating effects of disruptions.
Regarding the emergence and impact of trust in supply chain decision making, a few
papers have used multiagent simulation models to study these phenomena. These papers
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use a definition of trust which is similar to ours, i.e., the ability of a supplier to provide the
promised amount of product within the promised time interval. Simulating the Beer Game
setting, [28] and [29] studied trust dynamics in a multi-echelon supply chain with more
than one agent in each echelon. Kim [28] observed that the existence of symmetrical trust
results in the emergence of collaboration and that such trust-based relationships reduce
inventory variability. Jalbut and Sichman [29] studied the effect of trust, suggestions and
lying. They observed that when there is honesty and communication, trust-based relation-
ships thrive. Sen et al. [30] designed adaptive budgeted multi-armed bandit algorithms to
discriminate between suppliers with different trustworthiness, by simultaneously managing
the budget for exploration and estimation of the reliability of suppliers. A common charac-
teristic of these work is that they only study the trustor’s behavior, i.e., how agents trust oth-
ers. In contrast, due to the joint adaptation of decision makers’ behaviors in a supply chain
setting, we examine the interplay of both trustor and trustee agents. In addition, our supply
chain agents are endowed with a ToM capability to be able to reason about behaviors of
other agents in the supply chain. Another important distinction of our study is the inclusion
of disruptions, adding a layer of complexity and realism to the study of trust dynamics in
supply chains.
Previously, we developed a framework for studying resiliency of critical supply chains con-
sidering human behavior [31]. This framework can be used to instantiate and test different dis-
ruption scenarios while considering human behavior. We provided some preliminary results
to showcase how considering human behavior adds a layer of complexity and realism to study-
ing supply chain disruptions. Building upon that framework, this paper studies a variety of sce-
narios to understand driving factors of pharmaceutical drug shortages.
Materials and methods
Supply chain model
In our simulations, we model a pharmaceutical supply chain consisting of three echelons:
manufacturers, distributors and healthcenters. At each time-step, healthcenters serve each
unit of patient demand with one unit of product. Healthcenters procure products from dis-
tributors. Similarly, distributors procure products by ordering from manufacturers. Based
on the orders from the distributors, manufacturers choose an amount to produce in each
time-step. To account for product manufacturing, processing, and shipment, a lead time of
a predefined number of weeks occurs between placing orders and their fulfillment. For every
unit of undistributed inventory, each agent will incur a certain per-unit inventory cost in
each time-step. Similarly, if agents are not able to satisfy their customers’ orders (from dis-
tributor/healthcenter agents) or demand (from patients), a backlog cost will be incurred for
each unit of unmet demand in each time-step. Any unmet demand is added on to the back-
log to be satisfied in the future, i.e., it will accumulate.
Decision making
Agents in different echelons have different types of decisions to make, as listed in Table 1. For
each type of decision, agents have different decision calculations available to them. Each deci-
sion calculation prescribes a procedure that agents follow to make a certain decision, i.e. how
much to allocate/order and to/from whom. Manufacturers only have one decision to make,
which is to decide how much to produce based on a base-stock decision calculation. The base-
stock decision calculation corresponds to an up-to level production decision that determines the
amount of inventory that agents keep to account for uncertainties in demand and the expected
demand during the lead time [32]. In contrast, distributors and healthcenters have two types of
Effects of trust-based decision making in disrupted supply chains
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decisions to make. Namely, for distributors, they need to first order from manufacturers where
the total order amount is determined by a base-stock decision calculation followed by an alloca-
tion of products to healthcenters. When distributors do not have enough inventory, they need
to choose between two types of allocation strategies, either proportionally, based on the relative
demand from the healthcenters, or preferentially, which first allocates inventory to meet the
demand of the preferred healthcenter and then distributes the remainder to the next preferred
healthcenter. As for healthcenters, they also decide their order amount based on a base-stock
decision calculation but have two options for splitting the order amount among the distributors,
either equally, i.e., ordering the same amount from each distributor, or proportionally, based on
the trustworthiness attributed to each distributor.
PsychSim and Theory-of-Mind reasoning
A key attribute of human interactions is that people have the capacity to maintain beliefs about
the beliefs, motivations and behaviors of other people involved in the interaction and use those
beliefs to inform their own behavior. This capacity to maintain beliefs about others is often
referred to as a Theory-of-Mind (ToM) [12]. Decision makers’ interactions in a supply chain
setting are no exception. While making decisions, each decision maker will account for how
others in the supply chain may react to its decision and how their beliefs and behaviors will
change as a result. In order to account for this, we use the PsychSim simulation tool [33] that
allows for modeling interactions among individuals or groups. PsychSim agents are bound-
edly-rational decision makers that try to achieve their goals by choosing actions that take into
account how the whole environment will evolve. This includes not only their observations
over the state of the system but also how other agents may react to their actions. This is
achieved by having each agent update its internal models of other agents in the world, i.e.,
they have a ToM capability.
In our simulations, agents’ actions involve realistic production, ordering, and allocation
procedures that are computationally-efficient piecewise-linear abstractions of standard prede-
fined decision calculations used by real-world decision makers found in the supply chain liter-
ature (e.g. see [32]), as stated in Table 1. An agent’s model of other agents consists of its belief
about their state, reward function and available actions. While making decisions, PsychSim
agents perform ToM reasoning by planning for a certain number of periods into the future. By
doing this, they can reason about how other agents will react in any of the hypothetical future
states resulting from the possible combinations of all agents’ actions. Specifically, agents try to
maximize their reward assuming that others also try to maximize their own reward, informed
by their current model of other agents. In addition, a discount factor models the fact that a
future reward is worth less than an immediate reward. A more detailed explanation of evolu-
tion of the system is described in the next section.
Table 1. Agent decision types and available decision calculations for each decision type.
Agents Decision Type Available Decision Calculations
Manufacturers Production Base-stock
Distributors Order Amount Base-stock
Inventory Allocation Proportional
Preferential
Healthcenters Order Amount Base-stock
Splitting Order Equally
Based on trustworthiness
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.t001
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Mathematical model
Supply chain agents act in an environment that dynamically unfolds based on uncertainties
concerning supply and demand as well as the beliefs and behaviors of other agents. There-
fore, we model our multiagent supply chain as a Partially Observable Markov Game
(POMG) [34] of interdependent decision makers. In our model, a time-step corresponds
to a period of interaction in the supply chain, e.g., a day or a week. A K-player POMG
evolves as follows:
• At each discrete time-step t, the game is in a state s(t) from a finite set S of possible states.
The state corresponds to a combination of states of all agents in the supply chain, including
order and demand amounts, inventories, backlogs, production levels, etc.
• Each agent k has access to a partial view of s(t), referred to as the observation, denoted as
ok(t), of agent k at time-step t. Based on its observations, each agent maintains a probability,
referred to as a belief, denoted by bk(s), of being at state s. In this paper, we assume that
agents have a perfect model of other agents’ states.
• At time-step t, each agent k selects, simultaneously and without explicit communication,
an action ak(t) from a set Ak of possible actions. Manufacturers only have a production
decision and only a base-stock decision calculation available for them, resulting in one pos-
sible action. Distributors have two types of decisions to make, an order amount decision
and an inventory allocation decision. Therefore they have combined actions which are
comprised of a base-stock decision calculation and either allocating the inventory propor-
tionally among healthcenters or preferring one healthcenter to allocate available inventory
to that healthcenter first, before allocating inventory to the others. Healthcenters also have
two types of decisions to make, the order amount and the ordering split. Thus, their avail-
able actions are combined actions comprised of a base-stock decision calculation and
either splitting the order equally or splitting the order based on the trustworthiness attrib-
uted to distributors. We write a(t) = {a1(t), . . ., aK(t)} to denote the joint action of all agents
at t.
• Each agent k is awarded a reward rk(s(t)) that depends only on s(t) for some bounded real-
valued reward function rk : S! R. The reward function encodes the agent’s goals, i.e., it
returns a scalar denoting how important some state is. Agents, depending on the echelon
they belong to, have different reward functions. Manufacturers and distributors try to min-
imize the sum of their inventory and backlog costs while maximizing the amount they
ship to downstream agents. On the other hand, healthcenters try to minimize the sum
of their inventory and backlog costs while maximizing the number of patients that they
treat.
• The world’s dynamics are modeled by a stationary deterministic transition function T: S ×
A! S where A = hA1, . . . ,AKi is the set of all possible joint-actions of the agents in the net-
work. The next state of the supply chain, s(t + 1) depends only on a(t) and s(t) as dictated
by T.
In the reported experiments, the world is composed of K = 6 agents, each modeled as an
individual decision maker, meaning that each makes its own decisions based on local observa-
tions and according to the models it has of the other agents. An agent k is denoted by the tuple
hAk, rki comprising the agent’s actions and goals. Each agent k has a ToM (a model) of all
other agents. We formally denote agent k’s model of another agent g by gk ¼ hAkg ; r
k
gi. Each
model thus contains the agent’s beliefs about the actions and goals of each other agent. For the
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purposes of our research, in this paper we assume agents have perfect models of other agents’
goals and beliefs. However, they don’t have a model of disruptions which prevents them from
observing the future state of all agents completely.
Agents’ decisions are based on a finite-horizon discounted reward scheme. Specifically, the
goal of each agent k is to select its actions at each time-step t so as to maximize:
QkðsðtÞ; aðtÞÞ ¼ E
XH
h¼0
gtrkðsðt þ hÞÞ
" #
; ð1Þ
where H is the planning horizon and γ the discount factor. Qk(s(t), a(t)) represents the
expected discounted value of executing some joint-action a in some state s for agent k.
Agents decide by planning H steps into the future. In our experiments this horizon is cho-
sen according to the number of echelons and an assumed lead time, so that agents can see the
effects of their decisions. During planning, agents reason about how they and all other agents
choose their actions in each of the hypothetical future states s(t + h), h = 0, . . . ,H. Specifically,
at each planning time-step t + h, an agent models other agents as being greedy with respect to
their reward function. As such, it selects an action a�kðt þ hÞ for each modeled agent k that
maximizes its expected discounted reward at time-step t + h as given by:
a�kðt þ hÞ ¼ argmaxak2AkQkðsðt þ hÞ; a
�ðt þ hÞÞ; ð2Þ
where a�ðt þ hÞ ¼ fa�kðt þ hÞ; a
k
1
ðt þ hÞ; . . . ; akgðt þ hÞ; . . . ; a
k
Kðt þ hÞg is the expected optimal
combination of all agents’ actions. Each akgðt þ hÞ; g ¼ 1; . . . ;K; g 6¼ k is the best response to
a�k that agent k estimates agent g will choose at hypothetical time-step t + h. Each best response
akgðt þ hÞ is calculated in a similar fashion by using agent k’s model of agent g, i.e., by choosing
from the modeled action-set Akg the action that maximizes Q
k
gðsðt þ hÞ; aðt þ hÞÞ according to
the modeled reward function rkg .
Agents therefore try to maximize their own reward while taking into account how other
agents are also seeking to maximize their expected reward.
Trustworthiness
At each time-step, a healthcenter updates its beliefs about the trustworthiness of each of its
distributors based on the on-time delivery rate of that distributor. Formally, we update the
trustworthiness that a healthcenter h attributes to a distributor d at each time-step t according
to:
Th;d;t ¼ ð1   dÞTh;d;t  1 þ dDh;d;t; ð3Þ
where Dh,d,t is the calculated on-time delivery rate of distributor d to healthcenter h at time t,
and δ is a sensitivity factor which determines how strongly the healthcenter reacts to the
most recent changes in the distributor’s on-time delivery rate. The higher this factor, the
stronger the reaction of the healthcenter to recent observations is.
When each healthcenter orders from a distributor, the distributor promises a lead time.
The on-time delivery rate of distributor d to heathcenter h at time t is calculated using the
last l observations. Let us denote the actual amount of product that h has received from d
at time t by Rh,d,t and the amount that h expects to receive from d at time t by Eh,d,t. In
calculating Eh,d,t, healthcenters account for order lead time, i.e., they expect to receive their
order after the promised lead time. As such, we update Dh,d,t at each observed time-step
Effects of trust-based decision making in disrupted supply chains
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761 February 18, 2020 8 / 21
according to:
Dh;d;t ¼
Xt
k¼t  l
Rh;d;k=Eh;d;k ð4Þ
Disruptions
Disruptions are unexpected events that interfere with the normal operation of some part of the
supply chain for a certain duration of time. One of the most common disruptions in pharma-
ceutical supply chains is a reduction in the production capacity of a manufacturing facility [2].
These disruptions can vary in severity—the amount of reduction in production capacity—and
breadth—the duration of time that the disruption lasts. We can see an illustration of different
features of reduction in the production capacity disruption in Fig 2.
Computational study setup
In the experiments that follow, the stylized model of the supply chain network is defined to be
as small as possible in order to analyze and interpret the joint adaptation of agents’ behaviors.
Meanwhile, to study the consequences of an agent’s decisions in the presence of other agents
in the same echelon, more than one agent is needed in each echelon. Therefore, we modelled a
3-echelon supply chain with 2 agents in each echelon, as illustrated in Fig 3.
Fig 2. Comparison between different disruption profiles. Disruption A, dashed red line; disruption B, solid blue
line; (a) disruption A has larger breadth compared to disruption B; (b) severity of disruption A is larger than severity of
disruption B.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g002
Fig 3. The network structure of the supply chain. The network consists of two manufacturers (Not-Disrupted MN
and Disrupted MN), two distributors (Not-Disrupted DS and Disrupted DS) and two healthcenters (Trust HC and
Equal HC).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g003
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Agents are assumed to have a perfect model of other agents’ states and actions, but they
don’t have a model of disruptions–importantly, this prevents agents from accurately modeling
their future states and those of other agents during a disruption. At each time-step, healthcen-
ters have constant patient demand. Given 3 echelons and an assumed lead time of 2 time-
steps, we set the planning horizon H = 6 time-steps so that agents are able to reason about the
effects of their decisions.
Each simulation starts at t = 0 and after a warm-up period the supply chain stabilizes, when
the ordering and shipping levels become constant across the network. After stabilization, we
simulate a disruption in at one of the manufacturers such that its production capacity decreases,
as defined by a severity parameter, for a certain number of time-steps, which is defined by a
breadth parameter. In the experiments that follow, we consider the three types of disruptions
listed in Table 2. All disruptions result in the same total decrease in production capacity for the
disrupted manufacturer, but have different temporal characteristics (i.e., the length of the dis-
ruption and the reduction in production capacity per time-step).
To examine the impact of the agents’ changing beliefs on the performance of the supply
chain, it is assumed that one of the healthcenters splits its order based on trustworthiness
(Trust HC), while the other splits its order equally (Equal HC). Moreover, in order to isolate
the effects of disruptions, coupled with the evolving agents’ trustworthiness beliefs, each dis-
tributor is connected to only one manufacturer. This also ensures that they are not influenced
by other interactions occurring in the network. One distributor (Disrupted DS) is supplied by
the manufacturer that experiences a disruption (Disrupted MN). The other distributor (Not-
Disrupted DS) is supplied by the manufacturer that is not disrupted (Not-Disrupted MN). Both
healthcenters can place orders with both distributors.
We defined, analyzed, and compared five different scenarios whose corresponding parame-
ters are provided in Table 3. In S1, we consider a scenario in which none of the agents perform
ToM reasoning, i.e, they do not consider how other agents in the network react to their actions.
In scenario S2, Disrupted DS performs ToM reasoning and changes the allocation decision cal-
culation it uses, based on its expectations about the healthcenters’ ordering behaviors. Allow-
ing Disrupted DS to use ToM reasoning capability enables us to analyze the agent’s response to
other agents more realistically. In scenario S3, we study the destabilizing effect of the sensitivity
factor δ by running simulations with settings similar to scenario S2 but with different values of
δ. Finally, in scenarios S4 and S5 we explore the role of exogenous factors in system outcomes,
specifically disruption features, in combination with the sensitivity of agents.
Table 2. Types of disruption profiles used in the experiments.
Disruption Type Severity Breadth
Short 84% 10
Moderate 42% 20
Long 17% 50
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.t002
Table 3. The scenarios used in the experiments. ToM refers to Disrupted DS performing Theory-of-Mind reasoning.
Scenario ToM Disruption Type Sensitivity δ
S1 No Short 0.5
S2 Yes Short 0.5
S3 Yes Short [0.025 − 0.5]
S4 Yes Long [0.025 − 0.5]
S5 Yes Moderate 0.5
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.t003
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Results and discussion
S1—No ToM reasoning
As listed in Table 3, in S1 Trust HC uses Eq 3 with sensitivity factor δ = 0.5 to update the trust-
worthiness it attributes to the distributors and Disrupted MN experiences a Short disruption
(Table 2). Moreover, none of the agents perform ToM reasoning.
We observe that when Disrupted DS does not have enough inventory to fulfill both health-
centers’ demands, it allocates its inventory proportionally among them. Trust HC benefits
from splitting its order based on trustworthiness and orders more from Not-Disrupted DS.
Therefore, its overall cost is 14% less than Equal HC’s overall cost.
S2—Effect of ToM reasoning by disrupted distributor
In this scenario the Disrupted DS performs ToM reasoning with a horizon of 6 time-steps.
Surprisingly, Disrupted DS, accounting for both healthcenters’ behavior, does not allocate its
inventory proportionally, but instead prefers Equal HC more often than Trust HC. An under-
standing of Disrupted DS’s preference is provided by a closer examination of what happens
during the disruption.
When the disruption occurs, the trustworthiness of Disrupted DS decreases and Trust
HC orders more from Not-Disrupted DS (Fig 4(a)). Not-Disrupted DS reacts to this sudden
change in demand by ordering more from its manufacturer. However, due to lead times,
Not-Disrupted DS is not able to fulfill these larger orders on time for Trust HC. This results
in a decrease in the trustworthiness of Not-Disrupted DS attributed by Trust HC (Fig 4(b)).
Thus, even though the disruption affects only one of the distributors, the trustworthiness of
both distributors decrease. Therefore, Trust HC repeatedly switches relative preferences for
the distributors.
Consequently, agents that are not directly connected to the disrupted agents are destabilized
as well and incur extra costs. Additionally, Disrupted DS, which performs ToM reasoning
about healthcenters’ behaviors, uses a preferential allocation since it can not profitably adjust
to Trust HC’s oscillating ordering behavior. Thus, Trust HC is at a disadvantage compared to
Equal HC.
Fig 4. Results for S2. (a) Trust HC’s order amounts to distributors; (b) Trust HC’s attributed trustworthiness to the distributors with δ = 0.5.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g004
Effects of trust-based decision making in disrupted supply chains
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761 February 18, 2020 11 / 21
We compare this simulation with one where both healthcenters split their orders equally
(neither healthcenter uses trustworthiness to split its order). As showen in Table 4, the overall
supply chain cost is lower when both healthcenters split their orders equally. The effects are
most significant for Disrupted MN and Disrupted DS. Trust HC is better off when it does not
use trustworthiness to inform decision making, in which case Disrupted DS has no preference
between healthcenters. However, Equal HC is worse off when both healthcenters split their
orders equally, since Equal HC receives preferential treatment when Trust HC adjusts orders
based on trustworthiness.
When we ran additional experiments with normally-distributed patient demands with dif-
ferent means and standard deviations, the results for demand with low variance were similar
to Table 4. Details of these experiments are discussed in S1 Appendix.
S3—Effect of sensitivity factor
As shown in the previous scenario, with δ = 0.5, Trust HC is at a disadvantage. To study the
effect of the sensitivity factor, we ran simulations equivalent to S2 with varying δ values. The
results are depicted in Fig 5.
Table 4. Changes in agents’ costs if one healthcenter uses trustworthiness to split the order compared to when
both split orders equally when experiencing a Short disruption.
Agent Change in Agent’s Cost
Trust HC 41%
Equal HC -28%
Not-Disrupted DS 7%
Disrupted DS 12%
Not-Disrupted MN 3%
Disrupted MN 10%
Overall Supply Chain 26%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.t004
Fig 5. Effect of sensitivity factor δ on healthcenters’ costs when experiencing a Short disruption.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g005
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For smaller δ values, Trust HC incurs fewer costs and therefore benefits from using trust-
worthiness. Fig 6(a) presents the trustworthiness attributed to Disrupted DS by Trust HC for δ
= 0.4, 0.2, 0.05. Trustworthiness oscillates less for lower values of δ. Further, Fig 6(b) shows
that the variability in order amounts from distributors when δ = 0.05 is less than when δ = 0.5,
as is shown in Fig 4(a). For small values of δ, instead of oscillating between the distributors
when the disruption occurs, Trust HC starts ordering more from Not-Disrupted DS and con-
tinues to do so until the aftermath of the disruption, at which point it starts ordering equally
from both distributors.
We conclude that in order to optimize incorporating trust in its behavior, Trust HC should
adjust its sensitivity factor, which will, in turn, also prevent the prolonged destabilization of
the entire supply chain. As we will see in the next scenario, making such an intentional choice
requires information about the disruption profile.
S4—Effect of disruption profile
In this scenario, the Disrupted MN experiences a Long disruption rather than a Short one. Vari-
ous sensitivity factors were simulated. The results from these simulations were compared with
the results from the simulation in which both healthcenters split their orders equally.
The results for the Long disruption depicted in Fig 7 are very different from those with a
Short disruption, depicted in Fig 5. Specifically, when the disruption is milder but longer, it is
less costly for Trust HC if it updates trustworthiness with a δ as high as 0.5. In contrast, when
facing a Short disruption, the same sensitivity factor of 0.5 destabilizes the whole supply chain
and Trust HC incurs additional costs. Thus, the level of sensitivity δ that benefits the healthcen-
ter under a certain disruption type can hurt the same healthcenter under a different type of dis-
ruption, as seen in the comparison of Tables 4 and 5. (See S1 Appendix for robustness of these
results when patient demand is normally-distributed with different means and standard devia-
tions.) As shown in Fig 7, Trust HC incurs a higher cost compared to Equal HC, but its cost is
significantly lower than when it splits its order equally (Table 5).
This difference can be explained by examining changes in order amounts of Not-Disrupted
DS during these disruptions, which is illustrated in Fig 8. An increase in orders to Not-
Fig 6. (a). Trust HC’s attributed trustworthiness to Disrupted DS with different sensitivity factors; (b) Trust HC’s order amount to both
distributors when δ = 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g006
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Disrupted DS requires increased production from Not-Disrupted MN, which in turn helps mit-
igate the effects of the disruption at Disrupted MN throughout the supply chain. However, due
to the existence of lead times, it takes multiple time-steps for Not-Disrupted DS to update its
order amount. For the Short disruption, by the time this change in production is achieved the
disruption is already over and it does not help in mitigating the effects of the disruption. On
the other hand, in a Long disruption, since the disruption is spread over a longer time period,
increased orders by Not-Disrupted DS will lead to increased production by Not-Disrupted MN
thereby bringing more product flow to the entire supply chain and mitigating the effects of the
disruption.
S5—Overall supply chain cost trajectory under different disruption profiles
In order to study how the overall supply chain cost trajectory changes with changes in the
disruption profile, we also examine a scenario in which the disruption length is between the
disruption lengths in the Short and Long disruptions, referred to as a Moderate disruption (see
Table 2). As mentioned previously, the total decrease in production capacity of Disrupted MN
Fig 7. Effect of sensitivity factor δ on healthcenters cost when experiencing a Long disruption.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g007
Table 5. Changes in agents’ costs if one healthcenter uses trustworthiness to order compared to when both split
order equally when there is a Long disruption.
Agent Change in Agent’s Cost
Trust HC -60%
Equal HC -90%
Not-Disrupted DS 14%
Disrupted DS -139%
Not-Disrupted MN 6%
Disrupted MN -132%
Overall Supply Chain -87%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.t005
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is the same across all three disruption. In scenario S5, Trust HC uses δ = 0.5 to update trust-
worthiness. While it may be expected that the overall supply chain cost when experiencing a
Moderate disruption would be less than the overall cost during a Short and greater than the
overall cost observed during a Long disruption, this is not the case. As shown in Fig 9 the over-
all supply chain cost does not change linearly with the duration of the disruption. Instead, the
overall supply chain cost in a system experiencing a Moderate disruption is greater than the
overall costs from both Short and Long disruptions.
In order to explain this behavior we examine the changes in the trustworthiness that Trust
HC attributes to the distributors under these three types of disruptions (see Figs 4(b), 10(b)
and 10(d)). The trustworthiness that Trust HC attributes to Disrupted DS with Moderate and
Long disruptions reduces to as low as zero. Additionally Trust HC’s order variability is higher
with Moderate and Long disruptions compared to the Short disruption (compare Fig 10(a) and
10(c) with Fig 4(a)).
Fig 8. Order amount of Not-Disrupted DS. When (a) disruption is Short; b) disruption is Long.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g008
Fig 9. Overall supply chain cost under different types of disruptions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g009
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As discussed in Scenario S4, in a system experiencing a Long disruption the additional
amount of product flowing into the system (as a result of Not-Disrupted DS increasing its order
amounts) happens during the time that disruption is still going on and it can help with mitigat-
ing the disruption. In contrast, with a Moderate disruption since the disruption is spread over a
shorter time period, by the time the product flow in the system increases the disruption is already
over, leading to higher inventory costs and having minimal effects on shortage costs (see Fig 11).
Fig 10. Comparing order amounts and trustworthiness with Moderate and Long disruptions. a) Trust HC’s order amounts to distributors with a Moderate
disruption; b) Trust HC’s attributed trustworthiness to the distributors with δ = 0.5 and a Moderate disruption; c) Trust HC’s order amounts to distributors with a
Long disruption; d) Trust HC’s attributed trustworthiness to the distributors with δ = 0.5 and a Long disruption.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g010
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To summarize, with Moderate disruption, the trustworthiness that Trust HC attributes to
Disrupted DS goes down to zero which results in high order variability and at the same time
the increase in product flowing to the system happens after the disruption is over. Therefore,
the overall supply chain cost is higher compared to both Short and Long disruptions.
For the sake of completion, we included a table containing changes in all agents’ costs if
one healthcenter uses trustworthiness with δ = 0.5 to order compared to when both split order
equally when experiencing a Moderate disruption in S1 Table. The results from the robustness
experiments for these results are included in S1 Appendix. In addition, we ran different simu-
lations with different levels of sensitivity factors and report changes in the costs of both health-
centers with a Moderate in S1 Fig.
Conclusion
Both industry leaders and healthcare providers agree that variability in orders and supply
quantities are negatively affecting the performance of supply chains and the drug shortage
crisis. In this paper, using a multiagent simulation, we aimed to identify the driving factors
behind the cascading and prolonged destabilization of supply chains, by modeling agents
with a ToM capability. The agents can plan ahead, accounting for other agents’ expected
reactions to their decisions in order to choose actions that maximizes their reward.
Having these more realistic models of human decision makers, our experiments showed
that in order to obtain a thorough picture of the drivers of the oscillations, the interplay of the
buyer and the suppliers’ behaviors must be considered. In particular, a buyer’s trust in a sup-
plier changes its ordering behaviors, and the supplier in turn reacts to these changes by adapt-
ing its own behavior. Due to this co-adaptation, the entire supply chain performance degrades
and the trust-sensitive buyer may end up being worse off.
However, this might be reversed under different settings where the buyer’s trust-sensitive
behavior may benefit itself and others. Specifically, in such settings, a trust-sensitive behavior
induces non-disrupted distributors to order more from manufacturers. As a result, the amount
of product flowing in the system increases, thereby helping in mitigating shortages. For this
effect to transpire, the supplier needs to be transparent about the disruption, since different
types of disruptions call for different optimal buyer behaviors.
Fig 11. Order amount of Not-Disrupted DS in face of Moderate disruption.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224761.g011
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Additionally, Our results argue that suppliers need to be able to estimate the duration and
severity of the disruption, perhaps through better data collection and historical data analysis.
Even if supply chain decision makers are not able to precisely estimate the disruption severity
and duration, being aware of the above-mentioned drivers of variability in supply chains can
aid in designing ordering policies, risk sharing mechanisms or even the conditions under
which it is critical to share information.
Finally, we observed that changes in supply chain cost under different disruptions does not
change linearly with the length of the disruption, when the total size of the disruption is held
constant. This nonlinear relationship is driven by the complexity of the dynamics of the sys-
tem, the interactions between suppliers and buyers, and the effects of lead times. These results
support the need for future research examining the role of disruption features and temporal
dynamics in supply chain shortages.
To assess the face validity of our simulations, the model, its assumptions, and results were
presented in detail to four pharmaceutical informatics experts in two meetings using the meth-
ods outlined in [35]. The experts are members of the American Society of Health System Phar-
macists. One of the experts is a long time consultant in the field, two are pharmacy PhDs, one
with long time experience in pharmaceutical supply chain technology and the other an Execu-
tive Director of Health System Pharmacy Services at a large scale teaching hospital. The fourth
expert is a leader in health information management.
The dynamics of agent behaviors, both in terms of order amounts and the choices of
whom to order from and how to prioritize inventory allocation among healthcenters, and
the dynamics of the trustworthiness measure were discussed and compared against the
experts’ experiences in the real world and well-studied supply chain simulations, such as
the classic Beer Game. All experts agreed that: (i) the results of the simulations were represen-
tative of pharmaceutical supply chain decision makers’ behaviors and (ii) analyzing how
behaviors change based on trustworthiness changes brought new insights to the observed
phenomena.
Decision makers in real-world supply chains face the challenge of maintaining mental
models of other entities relying only on partial information. In future work, we will study
supply chain networks where the agents have imperfect models of each other. We will inves-
tigate methods for potentially realizing successful co-adaptation based on enabling agents to
anticipate their changing beliefs about each other and thereby explore ways to inform those
beliefs.
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